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Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking
in Women:
Definitions, Paradigms, and Contexts
Janie Chuang*
As evidenced by international treaties dating back to the early
twentieth century, the problem of trafficking in women is by no means
a new phenomenon. However, it has only been in recent years that the
problem of trafficking has again drawn world-wide concern, partly in
response to reports of the sexual enslavement of Muslim women in
Serbian brothels during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and
partly in response to the increasing prevalence of the trafficking of
children for sexual purposes.'
Despite the considerable amount of attention recently paid to this
issue, however, analyses and reporting have focused on the more tradi-
tional forms of trafficking and its obvious victims-i.e., women and
children forcibly recruited for the purposes of forced prostitution. In
contrast, modern manifestations of trafficking can involve the coerced
recruitment and transportation of women not only for forced prostitu-
tion, but for a variety of other forced labor and slavery-like practices,
such as forced domestic labor, factory labor, and commercial marriages. 2
Moreover, not all trafficked women ultimately are subjected to forced
*.J.D., Harvard Law School, 1998; B.A., Yale University, 1995. The author is grateful to
Professor Martha Minow for her insightfhl comments on drafts of this Article, and to Christiana
Ochoa, Gillian Caldwell, Regan Ralph of the Human Rights Watch/Women's Rights Project,
Peter Rosenblum, Deborah Anker, and Lara Stemple of the Harvard Law School Human Rights
Clinical, and Ali Miller of the International Human Rights Law Group for their support and
guidance in the formulation of the ideas contained within. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author.
1. Nora Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an International Offense, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
163, 163-64 (1994). Children's rights advocates have called attention to the expansion of
trafficking and forced prostitution into the sale of young children, who are valued for their
innocence and virginity due to customers' fears of contracting AIDS. See id
2. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N.
ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), at 19, U.N.
Doe. E/CN.4/1997/47 (1997) (hereinafter Report of the Spe ial Rapporteur on Violence Against Women].
This Article uses the term "fIrced labor/slavery-like practices" to connote the wide range of
coercive working and living conditions to which women can be subjected, including, among other
practices, forced domestic labor, factory labor, forced marriages, and false adoptions.
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labor/slavery-like practices, and not all women who are subjected to
forced labor/slavery-like practices have been trafficked. With interna-
tional migration on the rise, increasing numbers of women subjected
to forced labor/slavery-like practices in a foreign country have not been
trafficked, but rather have entered the country legally or illegally by
other means. The narrow portrayal of trafficking as necessarily involv-
ing forced recruitment for the purposes of forced prostitution thus
belies the complexity of the current trafficking problem, and overlooks
numerous victims whose experiences diverge from more traditionally
recognized forms of trafficking. Moreover, because international anti-
trafficking law reflects this narrow conception of trafficking, the exi-
gencies of modern manifestations of trafficking in women have ren-
dered these laws inadequate to prevent and redress the trafficking
problem. By defining trafficking as requiring both coercive recruitment
and forced prostitution, women subject to one but not the other
practice, as well as those subjected to non-sexual forced labor/slavery-
like practices, remain ineligible for protection under international anti-
trafficking law.
In response to the deficiencies of existing international anti-traffick-
ing laws, numerous nongovernmental and intergovernmental organiza-
tions have called for a reformulation of the trafficking concept and an
expansion of these laws.3 While these institutions have agreed on the
necessity of a reconceptualization of the trafficking problem, they have
yet to reach a consensus on a minimum working definition of traffick-
ing. Points of conflict concern such issues as whether coercion should
be a necessary element of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like prac-
tices, and if so, how coercion should be defined and measured. These
issues also implicate related questions concerning whether or not pros-
titution per se and the recruitment aspect of trafficking are inherently
exploitative, which, in turn, raise highly controversial issues concern-
ing a woman's capacity to choose to sell her body or to consent to
recruitment by a trafficker in order to immigrate by illegal means.
These and other definitional issues challenge traditional assumptions
regarding the nature of the violation to women's rights inflicted by
trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices.
Apart from the necessity of resolving the definitional issues concern-
ing international anti-trafficking law, a comprehensive approach to
trafficking in women must also address the practical difficulties that
arise with respect to the domestic enforcement of these international
3. See id. at 19; see also, ag., NOTRAF, Basic Principles for a Code of Conduct within the A femhsr
States of the European Union to Prevent and Combat Traffic in Women (visited Oct. 21, 1997)
<http://home.pi.net/-notraf/code.htm> [hereinafter NOTRAF, Basic Principles for a Code of Con-
duct].
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standards. Where international anti-trafficking laws apply, their capac-
ity to provide effective remedies to victims of trafficking and forced
prostitution is compromised by conflicting domestic immigration and
anti-prostitution laws which, in the absence of these international legal
standards, would hold these women criminally liable for prostitution
and illegal immigration. The unfortunate reality of international law
is that states often are reluctant to forego the enforcement of their
domestic laws in order to adhere to international legal standards.
Moreover, the fact that law enforcement officials sometimes are com-
plicit, if not active participants, in trafficking and forced labor schemes
can create a significant disincentive against local enforcement of inter-
national anti-trafficking law.
In light of the complex problems of definition and practice discussed
above, this Article examines the scope and practical efficacy of existing
and proposed legal protections applicable to victims of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices. 4 Without offering authoritative so-
lutions, this Article explores the potential ramifications of alternative
approaches to these issues in order to provoke further thought and
discussion toward developing viable solutions to the problem of trafficking
in women.
With these objectives and reservations in mind, this Article begins,
in Part I, with an overview of the sequence of events that can charac-
terize the experiences of women who are trafficked and/or subjected to
forced labor/slavery-like practices. Attentive to the women whose ex-
periences diverge from the forced trafficking/forced prostitution stereo-
type, Part II surveys existing international anti-trafficking law and the
recently proposed changes to this law. This discussion focuses on the
normative consequences and practical difficulties caused by subtle dif-
ferences in definition, particularly with respect to their effect on the
range of women deemed eligible for protections against trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices. This section also discusses the vari-
ous paradigms that might inform or influence the normative and
strategic choices that must be made with respect to these definitional
4. Given that the problem of trafficking implicates a wide range of issues, a few limitations
are necessary to cabin the discussion contained in this Article. Though recognizing that trafficking
and forced labor/slavery-like practices often victimize children, this Article assumes that the
victims discussed herein are of the age of consent for two reasons. First, in order to illustrate
more effectively the limitations of existing anti-trafficking law, this Article aims to draw attention
to the less obvious victims of trafficking, or those victims whose experiences deviate from the
stereotypical situation of forced recruitment and transportation, and forced prostitution. The
situation of children tends to fall beyond the range of such cases because of the general assumption
that children are not fully capable of giving informed consent. Second, and most significantly,
children are protected under an additional body of law focused on children's rights, which may
require remedies for child victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices that
significantly differ from remedies necessary to protect women victimized by these practices.
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issues. Finally, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of
how these laws actually translate into practice, Part III analyzes the
interaction-and conflict-between international anti-trafficking law
and domestic immigration and anti-prostitution laws. Mindful of the
situations in which these laws conflict, this section examines possible
resolutions that would allow victims of trafficking and forced labor/
slavery-like practices to remain protected under the appropriate legal
regime.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
In what has become a flourishing international industry, thousands
of women are trafficked and forced to work or live under slavery-like
conditions as prostitutes, domestic laborers, sweatshop laborers, or
commercial wives.5 Trafficking, or the recruitment and transportation
of women for profit, occurs both within countries 6 and across borders.
Internationally, trafficking occurs primarily from the South to the
North,7 and increasingly, between Southern countries. 8 While traffick-
ing patterns vary according to global supply of and demand for trafficked
women, trafficking generally arises in conditions of poverty and in
locations that lack viable economic opportunities relative to other
countries. 9 Technological advances, such as the Internet, have expanded
the scope of traffickers' networks and thus have facilitated effective
response to the needs of the market. 10
Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty, sexism, and racism, all
of which combine to create a situation of unequal bargaining power
and vulnerability. In developing countries or countries with economies
in transition, conditions of poverty-which are aggravated for women
5. Report ofthe Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 2, at 19.
6. Id. at 20. For example, Brazil has an active network that traffics women and girls for
prostitution to mining camps and large civil construction projects within the country. Id. Also,
the trafficking of Chinese women for marriage is so prevalent that in some counties and villages,
30-90% of marriages result from trafficking. The shortage of women in rural areas of China,
combined with the expense of non-forced wedding ceremonies, contributes to the high demand
for trafficked women for forced marriages. Id at 22-23.
7. Id. at 20. Examples include the trafficking of Colombian women for prostitution to Spain,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, and the United States. See id.
8. Id. at 19. Examples include the trafficking of Colombian women for prostitution to Vene-
zuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Id. at 20.
9. The promotion of tourism as a development strategy has contributed to the prevalence of
trafficking in women for prostitution. In Kenya, for example, the tourism industry has led to
increased trafficking in the region, with traffickers luring women from Uganda and India to Kenya
in order to provide prostitutes for the growing tourist population. Id.
10. Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
Its Causes and Its Consequences, reports that the Internet has become an "integral component"
of trafficking in women for marriages, used both to advertise marriage brokers and to display
potential brides. Id at 20.
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because of their traditionally lower economic status in these coun-
tries--can lead women to accompany traffickers. These conditions can
also compel families to sell their female relatives to traffickers in the
hopes that they will have an opportunity to earn money for themselves
or their families. In addition, racial factors can drive international
trafficking across borders for the purpose of recruiting foreign women
to meet the racial preferences of certain brothel clientele. 1 Traffickers
and pimps can more easily subjugate foreign women due to their
inability to speak the language of the country in which they reside,
their fear of local police who often are complicit in trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices, and their fear of deportation to their
native communities where they might be treated as criminals for
having engaged in prostitution.12
Traffickers use a variety of devices to recruit women into prostitu-
tion, forced labor, and slavery-like practices, often through deception
and coercion, and sometimes with the complicity of the woman's
family. Women from impoverished families in Bangladesh, Nepal, and
Burma sometimes sell their daughters to traffickers--or these women
might themselves agree to accompany the traffickers-believing that
they will be able to earn money for the family through employment
as maids, cooks, or in other jobs requiring few skills. 13 What these
women and their families do not realize, however, is that their daugh-
ters could be subject to forced prostitution, domestic or sweatshop
labor under slavery-like conditions, or forced marriages. To execute the
deception, traffickers often use sham employment contracts and false
visas to mislead women and their families about the type of work they
will undertake. 14 Some traffickers will even go so far as to marry their
11. For instance, the preference in Indian brothels for Nepali prostitutes for their reputation
for sexual acquiescence and their 'golden' skin can drive the trafficking from Nepal to India.
HuaN RIGHTS WATCH, GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 232-33 (1995)
(hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT].
12. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 188-89.
13. See ASIA WATCH AND THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, A MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY:
TRAFFICKING OF BURMFSE WOMEN AND GIRLS INTO BROTHELS IN THAILAND 45-46 (1993)
[hereinafter ASIA WATCH THAILAND REPORT]. The report notes, however, that four out of the
thirty women and girls (who had set out on their own) interviewed by Human Rights Watch
knew when they left home that they would be involved in some form of prostitution. Id. at 46.
Human Rights Watch recounts a "pathbreaking study" of Burmese women in Thai brothels
written by Hnin Hnin Pyne, who classified different means of entry into prostitution: voluntary,
bonded, and involuntary:
Voluntary indicates that the woman, prostitute-to-be, approaches the owner/manager
of a sex establishment hersel, bonded implies the involvement of parents or guardians,
who receive money from an agent or owner for giving away their daughter; and
involuntary conveys the use of deception and coercion of the women by an agent or
owner/manager.
I. at 45.
14. Women from Central and Eastern European countries have found themselves forced into
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victims as a ruse of recruitment 15 or to protect themselves and their
victims from prosecution for illegal immigration and illegal sex. 16
In order to control trafficked women, traffickers often subject their
victims to debt bondage, a slavery-like practice banned under custom-
ary international law, and defined as:
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of
his personal services or of those of a person under his control
as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reason-
ably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the
debt or the length and nature of those services are not respec-
tively limited and defined.' 7
The debt may consist of the amount paid to the family or the trafficker,
transport costs, protection money paid to police and other officials, and
advances for the women's living expenses. Moreover, the amount paid
to the girl's family or to the trafficker may be doubled to include
interest.'8 In order to prevent them from escaping before they pay their
debts in full, traffickers often forcibly detain women in apartments,
factories, homes, or brothels. In addition to the pressure of debt pay-
ment, women may feel compelled to support their families by sending
them whatever earnings they do receive, usually in tips. 19 In situations
in which a woman's family has been complicit in her sale, her male
relatives sometimes make periodic trips to the brothel to collect the
woman's earnings, or the woman will send the money back to her
family.20 Typically unaware of how much the brothel owner paid for
them, women trafficked into prostitution may be kept in debt bondage
prostitution abroad, despite their having signed contracts for waitressing, child care, or domestic
labor. Report of the Speial Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 2, at 21.
15. Traffickers will use marriage offers to lure girls away from their homes and will sometimes
even participate in an actual wedding ceremony. Human Rights Watch recounts the exploits of
a trafficker who had trafficked nine girls by marrying them. Upon bringing each of them to
Bombay, he would abandon the girl in a crowd. The traffickers accomplice would approach the
girl and offer to help her find her husband and, instead, lead her to a brothel. GLOBAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 242.
16. For example, Bengali traffickers marry their victims in order to protect themselves from
being prosecuted under Islamic hudud laws in their trafficking of women to Pakistan. In spite of
these efforts, Special Rapporter Radhika Coomaraswamy reports, thousands of Bangladeshi
women and children have been detained in Pakistan under these laws, charged with illegal entry
and for having "illegitimate sex." Report of the Special Rapporteur on iolence Against Women, supra
note 2, at 22.
17. GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 200-01 (quoting Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Section I,
Article 1 (1957)).
18. ASIA WATCH THALAND REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
19. GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 248.
20. Id at 247-48.
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for a longer amount of time than necessary to reimburse the brothel
owner.
21
Local governments often are complicit and sometimes directly in-
volved in trafficking and forced prostitution schemes. For instance, in
the trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thailand, there is
"clear official involvement in virtually every stage of the trafficking
process" yet little concerted effort by Thai authorities to investigate
and punish such abuses by their own agents.22 In addition to receiving
bribes from traffickers along border checkpoints, Thai police often
patronize the brothels themselves. 23 Similarly, in the trafficking of
Nepalese women and girls to India, Indian brothel keepers will inform
the police of the arrival of a new victim and pay a price for their silence,
and may even provide brothel services to Indian police or hire these
officers to serve as traffickers themselves.24
Trafficking victims who manage to escape from debt bondage may
be subject to deportation, a process which threatens to be as corrupt
and abusive as other aspects of the victims' ordeal. For instance, in
Thailand, the deportation of Burmese women often involves further
extortion and sexual abuse by Thai officials exploiting their fear of
Burmese authorities.25 For Burmese women trafficked into Thailand,
return to Burma often results in criminal liability for having left the
country illegally or having engaged in prostitution.26 A woman might
therefore be coerced into having sex with a Thai official in exchange
for her safe return to Bangkok, or she might be lured into more brothel
work by the offers of numerous brothel agents at the border.
For women who manage to escape forced prostitution, the social
stigma attached to their former prostitution activities threatens to
create a vicious cycle in which these women believe they have no
alternative but to return to prostitution.27 After leaving the brothel,
21. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATcH/ASiA, RAPE FOR PROFIT: TRAFFICKING OF NEPALI GSas AND
WOMEN TO INDIA'S BROTHELs 17 (1995) [hereinafter ASIA WATCH INDIA REPORT] (recounting
the case of "Maya," who never knew how much her pimp paid for her and who knew a fellow
brothel inmate who had worked for thirteen years without ever managing to pay off her debt);
see also AsIA WATCH THAILAND REPORT, supra note 13, at 54-59; GLOBAL REPORT, supra note
11, at 239.
22. ASIA WATCH THAIIAND REPORT, supra note 13, at 75.
23. See id. at 75, 77.
24. See ASIA WATCH INDIA REPORT, supra note 21, at 44.
25. See ASIA WATCH THAILAND REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
26. See id. at 7.
27. See id. at 74. The report recounts the situation of two girls who had returned to prostitu-
tion in Thailand after safely returning to their native villages. One believed that, since she had
lost her virginity anyway, she might as well earn money for her family. The other girl felt that
the shame of being known in her village as a former prostitute was too great, and went back
into prostitution in order to help her family. Id. at 47. The report notes that these cases are
instructive:
because they indicate the impact of brothels on the girls' self-image. Both [women]
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these women may be sick and unable to work. Shunned by their
families and their native communities, these women may resign them-
selves to a life of prostitution as their only available means of survival. 28
To the extent that these women feel they can return to their native
villages, they often do so not as victims returning home with hopes of
establishing a new life, but as recruiters in search of girls-either to
take their own places and thus secure their own release from bondage,
or to establish their own brothels. 29 Being particularly well-positioned
to identify potential trafficking victims due to their familiarity with
the local girls and families, these women-themselves victims of traffick-
ing and forced prostitution-ironically, may be in the best position to
perpetuate these practices. A lack of effective legal mechanisms that
encourage victims to report abuses or that provide the remedies and
support they need to rebuild their lives fuels this cycle and threatens
to lead to the re-victimization of these women.
Hence, adverse socioeconomic factors and lack of recourse available
to those victimized by trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices
combine to create and to maintain a burgeoning worldwide trade in
women. In order to be effective, efforts to combat these practices must
respond to the wide range of circumstances that effect the victimization
of women. For example, these measures must extend to women who
are trafficked for any forced labor/slavery-like practice, including forced
domestic labor, factory labor, and commercial marriages. Moreover,
these measures must also take into account the fact that not all victims
of forced labor/slavery-like practices were forcibly trafficked, and con-
versely, that not all trafficked women ultimately are subjected to forced
labor/slavery-like practices, and, in light of such variations, extend
protections to victims of either practice. In addition to expanding the
decided that since they had lost their virginity anyway, there was no point in staying
at home; they might as well return to Thailand and try to make more money. Their
return to prostitution was voluntary only in the sense that they saw their first experi-
ence as'having rendered them unfit for anything else.
Id at 74. See also ASIA WATCH INDIA REPORT, supra note 21, at 50-51. The report recounts the
description provided by a female police officer in Bombay of how most Nepalese women she
encountered in brothel raids did not wish to return to Nepal. The reasons they gave were that
they
felt violated and "spoiled" and therefore social pariahs; they believed they would never
be free to leave for reasons of crushing "debt" to their madams or because they feared
violent reprisals; they had nothing to return to; they feared the contempt and rejection
of family members; they had no resources, either to make a new life for themselves or
to placate their families.
Id
28. Some women who have managed to earn enough money may be accepted into their
communities and may even marry. However, diseases contracted in the brothels often leave the
women sterile, and the marriages rarely last longer than the money the women bring into the
marriages. See GLoBAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 231 & n.6 8.
29. See id. at 231, 239.
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class of beneficiaries, comprehensive efforts must include some means
of breaking the vicious cycle of victimization by providing recourse for
victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices to find
viable, alternative means of survival once out of the grasp of their
abusers.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS
While, in theory, international law could play a critical role in
combating trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices, the devel-
opment of standards which adequately respond to the complexities of
these practices promises to be a project wrought with conceptual and
practical difficulties. Premised on a definition in which trafficking is
linked to forced prostitution, existing international anti-trafficking law
is ill-equipped to address trafficking for forced domestic and sweatshop
labor, and forced marriage. Attempts by various institutions to address
these deficiencies through the formulation of a new definition of traffick-
ing have met with sharp division,30 with fault lines drawn along such
issues as whether trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices
should be defined separately, whether coercion should be a necessary
element of each practice, and if so, how coercion should be defined.
Not only do these definitional issues present complex theoretical dis-
tinctions, but they also implicate difficult normative choices. For in-
stance, the view that coercion could be economic in nature might
suggest a stance in favor of the abolition of prostitution per se based on
the assumption that women are driven into prostitution by economic
hardship. This position, in turn, would bring into scrutiny one's un-
derlying assumptions regarding the potential empowerment of women
to make informed choices about their lives, as opposed to an inevitable
victimization of women by a perennial false consciousness or internal-
ized oppression.31 With these and other concerns in mind, this section
30. For example, debates over the legalization of prostitution have created a sharp split within
the anti-trafficking movement, most notably between the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in
Women (GAATW) and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), two major
coalitions of nongovernmental organizations working to combat trafficking. While GAATW and
CATW agree on the need for decriminalization of prostitutes, GAATW seeks the legalization of
prostitution as commercial sex work, whereas CATW adamantly opposes legalization on grounds
that prostitution "reduces all women to sex." See COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN,
A WORLD IN WHICH WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE HUAsNz RIGHTS (on file with the Harvard Human
Rights Journat). For a sense of the substance of the legalization debates, see PointlCounterpoint: Would
Legalizing Prostitution Help?, TRANSITIONS: MAG. CHANGES POST-CoMMUNIST SOCIETIES, Jan.
1998 (including opposing position pieces between Gillian Caldwell of the Global Survival
Network, arguing for legalization and Donna Hughes of CATW, arguing against legalization) (on
file with the Harvard Human Rights Journal).
31. The term "Ealse consciousness" is used in this Article to refer to the idea that a woman is
unable to recognize her own oppression. The origin of the term "false consciousness" has been
attributed to the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who used "false consciousness" to
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of the Article assesses existing and proposed definitions of trafficking
and forced labor/slavery-like practices with a focus on their implications
for the different strategies potentially adopted by the anti-trafficking
movement.
A. International Anti-Trafficking Law
1. The Early Treaties
International trafficking in women has been recognized as an inter-
national offense since the late nineteenth century, when concern over
"white slave traffic," or the export of European women into brothels
in various parts of colonial empires, prompted the signing of the
International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic in
1904 ("1904 Agreement").32 The 1904 Agreement distinguished be-
tween "pure and innocent" women and former prostitutes, a distinction
which continues to foster an ambivalent attitude toward victims of
trafficking for forced prostitution.33 While the 1904 Agreement re-
quired States Parties to promise to collect information regarding the
procurement of women abroad, it was not until the promulgation of
the International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic
("1910 Convention") that States Parties were required to criminalize
the procurement of women. 34 The 1910 Convention bound its signa-
tories to punish severely any person who hired, abducted, or enticed
for immoral purposes any woman under the age of twenty-one, or used
violence, threats, fraud, or any compulsion on a woman over twenty-
one for the same purpose. 35 However, the retention of a girl or woman
in a brothel against her will was excluded from the purview of the
1910 Convention because such matters were considered to fall within
a country's domestic jurisdiction.36 Both the 1904 Agreement and the
refer to a phenomenon "in which the oppressed come to identify with their oppressors, internalize
their views, and thus appear to consent to their subordination." Richard Delgado, Rodrigos Sixth
Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.YU. L. REv. 639, 674 (1993)
(quoting ANTONIO GRAmscI, LETrERS FROM PRISON (Lynne Lawner ed. & trans., 1973); SELEC-
TIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAmscI, 416-18 (Quintin Hare & Geoffrey
N. Smith eds. & trans., 1971)). Some commentators prefer the phrase "internalized oppression"
over "false consciousness," because the latter term "simultaneously emphasizes the importance of
internal constraints on identity and avoids the suggestion that 'true consciousness' is possible."
Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1657, 1703 n.173 (1997).
32. Laura Reanda, Prostitution as a Human Rights Question: Problems and Prospects of Unitcd Nations
Action, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 202, 207 (1991).
33. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 167.
34. Id. at 167-68.
35. Id. at 168-69.
36. Id. at 169; see also U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON TRAFFIC IN
PERSONS AND PROSTITUInON at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SDI8, U.N. Sales No. 59.IV.5 (1959)
[hereinafter 1959 U.N. STUDY].
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1910 Convention thus were explicitly limited to the process of recruit-
ment or transportation, and did not address the end purposes of the
trafficking. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Women and Children ("1921 Convention"), and the Interna-
tional Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full
Age ("1933 Convention") continued to consider the end purposes of
trafficking to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction.37 Notwithstanding
this limitation, the 1921 Convention expanded the scope of the pro-
tective measures provided in previous instruments to non-white women
and children of either sex.38 Moreover, the 1933 Convention declared
that although a woman might consent to being trafficked, such consent
would not constitute a defense to the crime of international traffick-
ing.39
2. Current International Anti-Trafficking Law
In an attempt to consolidate the prior treaties on trafficking, the
United Nations promulgated, in 1949, the Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Pros-
titution of Others (the "1949 Convention").40 The 1949 Convention
was the first international agreement to conceive of trafficking in
gender neutral terms, and to penalize procurement, irrespective of
consent, in both international and domestic trafficking. Most notably,
the 1949 Convention was the first international instrument to consider
forced prostitution a matter of international law, rather than strictly
an issue of domestic jurisdiction.41 This extension of the 1949 Con-
vention to the issue of domestic prostitution influenced the decision of
a number of States Parties to the earlier anti-trafficking instruments
to refuse to accede to this new convention.42
The 1949 Convention does not provide explicit definitions of traffick-
ing and forced prostitution. It does, however, define actions that are
37. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 170.
38. Id.; 1959 U.N. STuDy, supra note 36, at 1.
39. Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution:
Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 217 (1997).
40. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 272, 282
(entered into force July 25, 1951) [hereinafter 1949 Convention).
41. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 172.
42. Less than half (66 out of 160) of the United Nations member states ratified the 1949
Convention. Grounds for refusal to ratify ranged from incompatibility with domestic constitutions
to criticism of the basic assumptions in the text. NOTRAF, Background Study on Basic Principles
for a Code of Conduct within the Member States of the European Union to Prevent and Combat Traffic in
Women, § 2.2 (visited Oct. 17, 1997) <http://home.pi.net/-notraf/backgrd/develop.htm> [here-
inafter NOTRAF, Background Study).
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prohibited by the Convention, penalizing any person who, "to gratify
the passions of another":
(1) [p]rocures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prosti-
tution, another person, even with the consent of that person;
(2) [elxploits the prostitution of another person, even with
the consent of that person.43
Based on these conceptions of trafficking and forced prostitution, the
1949 Convention establishes three types of state obligations. 44 First, it
binds states to a general anti-trafficking principle and obliges signato-
ries to work for the abolition of sex trafficking. Viewing trafficked
women as victims of pimps and customers, the 1949 Convention
requires signatories to refrain from penalizing women who engage in
prostitution, and to refrain from subjecting prostitutes to any special
supervision or registration.45 Second, in accordance with Articles 8
through 15, signatories agree to participate in specific enforcement
measures, including cooperating in the extradition of traffickers, coor-
dinating investigation efforts, sharing information, and recognizing
foreign trafficking convictions. 46 Third, in accordance with Article 16,
the signatories agree to attempt to rehabilitate and otherwise support
the victims of prostitution by using various social welfare tools such
as public education, health care, and social services.47
While the 1949 Convention is fairly precise in establishing the
specific obligations of States Parties, commentators have criticized its
ambiguity with respect to whether or not the framers of 1949 Con-
vention intended to abolish all forms of prostitution, or only forced
prostitution. Under the terms of the Convention, prostitution and
trafficking are "incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human
person and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family and the
community."48 As revealed by a report issued by the U.N. pursuant to
the 1949 Convention, the drafters of the 1949 Convention intended
43. 1949 Convention, supra note 40, arts. 1-2, at 274.
44. See Susan E Toepfer & Bryan S. Wells, The Worldwide Marketfor Sex: A Review ofInternational
and Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 96
(1994).
45. Article 6 requires that each party agrees:
to take all necessary measures to repeal or abolish any existing law, regulation or
administrative provision by virtue of which persons who engage in or are suspected of
engaging in prostitution are subject either to special registration or to the possession
of a special document or to any exceptional requirements for supervision or notification.
1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 6, at 276.
46. Toepfer & Wells, supra note 44, at 97 (citing 1949 Convention, supra note 40, arts. 8-15,
at 276-80).
47. Id. (citing 1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 16, at 280).
48. Id. preamble, at 272.
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neither to regulate nor to prohibit prostitution, however, but rather to
work toward abolition of the "exploitation of prostitution."49 A num-
ber of studies conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations
in the 1920s and 1930s had concluded that 'the fear that abolition
would result in an increase of venereal disease or would be prejudicial
to public order has been proved [sic] to be unfounded, and that the
danger of international trafficking has been diminished by the closing
of the houses.' 50 Based on these findings, the framers concluded that
measures should be taken to abolish the regulation of prostitution.
Accordingly, under Article 6 of the 1949 Convention, States Parties
agree to abolish any existing laws or regulations under which persons
who engage in prostitution are subject to special registration or excep-
tional requirements for supervision or notification. 51 At the same time,
however, the framers did not want to prohibit or criminalize prostitu-
tion, for fear that prohibition would drive prostitution underground,
and that laws designed to punish both the client and the prostitute,
in practice, would be selectively enforced only against the prostitutes.52
Nevertheless, while it is clear that States Parties are to refrain from
regulating prostitution and prosecuting prostitutes, it is unclear whether,
in requiring states to combat the "exploitation of prostitution," such
efforts are to be targeted at all forms of prostitution or only forced
prostitution.53
49. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SocIAL AFFAIRs, ActivITIss FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF WOMEN: EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE at 18, U.N. Doc. STIESA/174, U.N.
Sales No. E.85.IV.11 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 U.N. REPORT).
50. 1959 U.N. STuDY, supra note 36, at 8. In his 1985 report, the Special Rapporteur on the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others states
that regulation can place the prostitute in a marginal position, can cause the prostitute to be
considered and to consider herself a criminal, and, as a result, make it virtually impossible for
her to escape prostitution. 1985 U.N. REPORT, supra note 49, at 18.
51. See 1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 6, at 276.
52. See 1959 U.N. STuDY, supra note 36, at 11.
53. The Programme of Action for the implementation of the 1949 Convention and the 1985
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others do suggest, however, a long-term goal of complete
abolition of all fbrms of prostitution. Concluding the 1959 U.N. STUDY, the Programme of
Action includes a plan designed to combat the traffic in persons and the exploitation of the
prostitution of others, as well as measures necessary to, and in conjunction with, the suppression
of the regulation of prostitution. See 1959 U.N. STuDY, supra note 36, at 32. The Programme of
Action includes a list of suggested measures to increase the "prevention of prostitution" which
contains no indication of a distinction between forced prostitution and prostitution generally, and
certainly does not target only forced prostitution. See 1959 U.N. STUDY, supra note 36, at 33.
Indeed, language contained in the 1985 REPORT equating all prostitution with forced prostitution
indicates that the ambiguity over whether the 1949 Convention aims to prohibit prostitution per
se or, rather, only coercive forms of prostitution ultimately may reduce to a false distinction. The
1985 U.N. REPORT states that, "even when prostitution seems to have been chosen freely, it is
actually the result of coercion," citing testimony by three collectives of women prostitutes from
two developed countries:
As prostitutes we are well aware that all prostitution is forced prostitution. Whether
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The only other international treaty to address explicitly the issue of
trafficking in women is the 1979 United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women54 ("CEDAW").
A broad, non-discrimination treaty, CEDAW requires States Parties to
take all appropriate measures to remove obstacles and to foster the
conditions necessary for women to realize their full potential as the
equals of men."5 Accordingly, CEDAW Article 6 mandates that all
States Parties "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution
of women." 56 The separation of the phrases "all forms of traffic in
women" and "exploitation of prostitution" in Article 6 could be interpreted
to include within its protections victims of trafficking for purposes other
than forced prostitution, such as trafficking for forced domestic labor and
forced marriage. While CEDAW arguably encompasses a broader range
of trafficking victims than does the 1949 Convention, as evidenced by
the rejection of a Moroccan proposal to include a provision obligating
states to combat all forms of prostitution, CEDAW clearly intends to
prohibit only forced prostitution.'7
3. Proposed New Definition of Trafficking
Notwithstanding the possibility of interpreting CEDAW to encom-
pass trafficking for purposes other than prostitution, the prevailing
interpretation of international anti-trafficking law, as defined by the
terms of the 1949 Convention, limits the applicability of its protec-
tions to victims of forced prostitution and trafficking for forced pros-
titution. Since these practices constitute only a portion of the wide
variety of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices, existing
international anti-trafficking law clearly is inadequate to respond to
the needs of many victims of modern forms of trafficking.
In response to the limited scope of the definition of "trafficking"
under current international law, numerous nongovernmental and inter-
governmental organizations have proposed alternative definitions of
trafficking. Perhaps the most prominent of these proposals has been
drafted by the Global Alliance Against the Trafficking of Women
("GAATW"), a coalition of nongovernmental organizations working
we are forced to become prostitutes by lack of money or by housing or unemployment
problems, or to escape from a family situation of rape or violence.., or by a procurer,
we would not lead the "life" if we were in a position to leave it.
1985 U.N. REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
54. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
55. See id. preamble, at 33.
56. Id. art. 6, at 37.
57. NOTRAF, Background Study, supra note 42, § 2.4.
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toward the elimination of trafficking in women. Numerous nongovern-
mental women's rights groups have used the GAATW definitions as a
springboard for assessing alternative policies and strategies to combat
trafficking, forced labor, and slavery-like practices.
58
The GAATW approach separates the act of recruitment from the
end purposes of trafficking, defining the former as "trafficking" and the
latter as "forced labour and slavery-like practices." GAATW defines
"trafficking" as:
All acts involved in the recruitment and/or transportation of
a person within and across national borders for work or
services by means of violence or threat of violence, abuse of
authority or dominant position, debt bondage, deception or
other forms of coercion.5 9
The GAATW defines "forced labour and slavery-like practices" as:
The extraction of work or services from any person or the
appropriation of the legal identity and/or physical person of
any person by means of violence or threat of violence, abuse
of authority or dominant position, debt-bondage, deception
or other forms of coercion.
60
As will be discussed in the following section, the GAATW definitions
significantly expand previous conceptions of trafficking to encompass
a broader range of the activities described above in Part I.
58. For example, the International Human Rights Law Group, an international human rights
organization based in Washington, D.C., with the help of the Harvard aw School Human Rights
Clinical, recently convened a working meeting of representatives of U.S.-based women's rights
organizations to identify and assess current issues facing the anti-trafficking movement, including
an exploration of the problems of definition and the ramifications of proposed legal remedies and
advocacy strategies. The GAATW definitions proved to be a useful framework for the discussions.
For a survey of the issues discussed at this meeting, see Harvard Human Rights Clinical,
International Trafficking in Women: An Exploration of the Issues (Jan. 29, 1998) (unpublished
paper presented at International Human Rights Law Group Roundtable on Trafficking in Persons)
(on file with the Harvard Human Rights Journal). Also, NOTRAF, a network of European
nongovernmental organizations, has used the GAATW definitions as the basis for its analysis and
policy. See, ag., NOTRAF, Basic Principles for a Code of Conduct, supra note 3.
59. Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women and the Foundation for Women in cooperation
with the Foundation Against Trafficking in Women: Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Forced Labour and Slavery-like Practices 1 (April 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Human Rights Journal) (hereinafter GAATW:
Standard Minimum Rules].
60. Id.
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B. Analysis and Critique of International Legal Protections-
Definitional Issues
A comparison between the definitions of trafficking set forth in the
GAATW proposal and the 1949 Convention reveals the breadth and
complexity of the issues implicated in the trafficking of women. For
example, the bifurcation of the GAATW definition into recruitment
and forced labor/slavery-like practices, and the catalogue of material
elements of each practice elucidate the wide variety of circumstances
and practices that can effect the victimization of women. Moreover, the
inclusion and exclusion of a coercion requirement in the GAATW and
the 1949 Convention definitions, respectively, evoke conflicting images
with respect to the nature of the victimization, whether by coercive
circumstances or by an inescapable false consciousness. Subtle defini-
tional differences range from straightforward line-drawing problems as
to who does or does not qualify as a victim of these practices, to
competing assumptions with respect to the potential empowerment of
women. These differences of definition can play a definitive role in the
formulation of strategies to provide remedies and protections to the
victims of these practices.
Attentive to the victims who are not protected under current inter-
national legal standards-i.e., those victims whose experiences diverge
from the traditional trafficking/forced prostitution scenario--this sec-
tion assesses the potential for a new definition that would provide
protections to a broader range of victims. More specifically, the discus-
sion in this section focuses on the issues implicated in the GAATW
definition and existing definitions of trafficking under international
anti-trafficking law, including: (1) the expansion of the traditional
prostitution-linked conception of trafficking to include trafficking for
non-sexual forced labor/slavery-like practices; (2) the distinction be-
tween abusive recruitment practices and abusive living and working
conditions; and (3) the definition of consent and its significance to the
determination of whether or not a woman has been victimized by
trafficking and/or forced labor/slavery-like practices. This section con-
cludes with a discussion of the overarching paradigms that may inform,
if not significantly influence, one's position on these definitional issues.
1. Inclusion of Trafficking for Non-Sexual Forced Labor/Slavery-Like
Practices
The emergence of new manifestations of trafficking such as traffick-
ing for domestic labor or commercial marriages, has made obvious the
need for an expansion of the trafficking definition to incorporate traffick-
ing for exploitative purposes other than forced prostitution. As dis-
cussed above, the 1949 Convention narrowly conceives of trafficking
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as necessarily linked to prostitution, and would neither penalize those
who traffic women and girls for purposes other than prostitution, nor
protect their victims.
Responding to these deficiencies in the definition of trafficking
under the 1949 Convention, the GAATW has developed a broader
definition of trafficking, which encompasses trafficking for any form of
forced labor/slavery-like practices. The GAATW definition of forced
labor/slavery-like practices skillfully incorporates non-sexual forms of
forced labor/slavery-like practices by highlighting common elements
among forced prostitution, forced domestic labor, and forced marriages.
Like trafficking for forced prostitution, women who are trafficked for
forced domestic labor and marriage are recruited by deceptive, coercive,
or violent means, and are subjected to slavery-like living and working
conditions under which they are denied their fundamental human
rights and freedoms. 61
These newer forms of trafficking often share with their more tradi-
tional counterparts the characteristic of occurring in areas that tradi-
tionally have been associated with women's work. 62 Indeed, these may
be the only areas of employment accessible to women, particularly in
countries experiencing economic deprivation.63 In such contexts, "women's
work" typically occurs in the informal sector of the economy, an area
traditionally considered beyond the realm of state responsibility and,
consequently, lacking in formal labor laws and regulations. 64 In addi-
tion, laws pertaining to property, inheritance, marriage, divorce, and
residence often deny women independence, mobility, and legal auton-
omy, and can thus foster trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like prac-
tices within marriages. 65 Hence, the general absence of regulations
governing the conditions of women's work in these areas, coupled with
continued, even increasing, economic marginalization of women, ne-
cessitate that women victimized by these practices be included in the
anti-trafficking agenda.
2. Separation of Trafficking and Forced Labor/Slavery-Like Practices
While the 1949 Convention addresses prostitution separately from
trafficking, it addresses trafficking only as it is linked to prostitution,
penalizing any person who, "to gratify the passions of another," "pro-
cures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person,
61. See NOTRAF, Background Study, supra note 42, § 3.5.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. European NGO Conference, NGO Statement 7 April 1997 (visited Oct. 21, 1997) <http://
home.pi.netl-notraf/sta.htm>.
Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 11
even with the consent of that person."66 By collapsing the distinction
between trafficking and forced prostitution in its treatment of traffick-
ing, the 1949 Convention confuses the notion of whether trafficking
as an act of recruitment absent any intent to force the women into
prostitution is a prohibited practice.
In contrast, by conceptually identifying trafficking (i.e., the recruit-
ment and transportation process) and forced labor/slavery-like practices
(i.e., the conditions in which women are forced to live and work) as
two separate practices, the GAATW definitions emphasize that not all
trafficking victims are subjected to forced labor/slavery-like practices,
and not all women subjected to forced labor/slavery-like practices are
also victims of trafficking. The distinction recognizes that one practice
can be an act of choice, while the other act an imposition of force,
deceit, or abuse. For example, a woman may be recruited under coer-
cive conditions and forcibly transported for the purpose of a forced
marriage, yet ultimately find herself in a marriage that does not amount
to a slavery-like situation. On the other hand, a woman may find
herself in a forced labor or slavery-like practice without ever having
been trafficked, but rather having engaged in illegal migration by her
own resources. Indeed, many women freely choose, within their avail-
able options, to migrate from one country to another, or from rural to
urban areas within a country.67 Although these women might consent
to the migration, they might not consent to subjugation under forced
labor/slavery-like practices.
The separation of the act of recruitment from the forced labor/slav-
ery-like practice is important analytically. On a descriptive level, the
separation of the two practices enables a clearer understanding of the
different dimensions of the trafficking problem. On a prescriptive level,
since measures to address abusive recruitment are not necessarily the
same as measures to prevent or to combat exploitative living and/or
working conditions, the conceptual separation of the two practices
facilitates a more precise formulation of policies and strategies to
combat these abuses.
The practical benefit of having separate definitions of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices is that protections could extend to
women victimized by one, but not ihe other practice. 68 Another ad-
vantage of the definitional separation is that the identification of forced
66. 1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 1, at 274.
67. See NOTRAF, Background Study, supra note 42, § 3.4.
68. Imagine, for example, a raid of a factory in which all of the workers were working under
slavery-like conditions. To make a distinction between workers who were trafficked and those
who were not trafficked, and to accord protections and remedies only to the former would seem
to yield an inconsistent result, considering that all of these workers were currently being forced
to work under slavery-like conditions.
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labor/slavery-like practices as a problem in and of itself focuses atten-
tion on the interest of protecting women, rather than the state interests
of restricting immigration or combating organized crime, which are
typically emphasized with respect to trafficking as recruitment.
The problem, however, with identifying trafficking and forced la-
bor/slavery-like practices as two distinct problems is the risk that states
might only be willing to adopt international legal protections for
victims of trafficking, but not for victims of forced labor/slavery-like
practices. For instance, a state might refuse to adopt protections for
the latter on grounds that forced labor/slavery-like practices are solely
a matter of domestic jurisdiction, to be addressed through national,
rather than international legislation.69 As a practical matter, the prob-
lem of forced labor/slavery-like practices may carry less political cur-
rency than trafficking, and may, therefore, tend to be overlooked.
Addressing this potentiality may require the anti-trafficking movement
to advocate explicitly on behalf of victims of forced labor/slavery-like
practices as a separate class of victims equally in need of protections.
3. Significance and Identification of Consent
The 1949 Convention considers consent to be irrelevant to the
determination of whether a woman has been victimized by trafficking
and the "exploitation of prostitution." In Article 1, the 1949 Conven-
tion penalizes anyone who, "to gratify the passions of another . . .
procures, entices or leads away, for the purposes of prostitution, another
person, even with the consent of that person."70 Article 2 similarly disre-
gards a woman's consent, penalizing those who "exploit the prostitu-
tion of another person, even with the consent of that person."71
Unlike the 1949 Convention, the GAATW framework requires
coercion7 2 as a necessary element of both trafficking and forced la-
bor/slavery-like practices. The GAATW distinction between the act of
recruitment and the conditions in which women are forced to live and
work is analytically useful in determining the presence or absence of
consent in the trafficking scenario. The requirement of coercion as a
necessary element of each of these practices recognizes that force can
operate on two equally important, but separate domains-on one level,
69. Indeed, a number of States Parties to the early anti-trafficking instruments refused to sign
onto the 1949 Convention due, in part, to the perception that the 1949 Convention encroached
on states' domestic jurisdiction over prostitution occurring within their borders. See supra text
accompanying notes 41-42.
70. 1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 1, at 274 (emphasis added).
71. Id. art. 2, at 274 (emphasis added).
72. Note that coercion under the GAATW definition includes violence, threat of violence,
abuse of authority or dominant position, debt-bondage, deception or other forms of coercion. See
supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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to create abusive recruitment and transportation practices, and on
another level, to create abusive living and working conditions.
a. The Significance of Consent
By eliminating the "even with consent of' language of the 1949
Convention in its definitions of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like
practices, the GAATW framework appears to preserve two controver-
sial possibilities. First, the GAATW framework appears to admit, as a
descriptive fact, that it is possible that a woman might choose to
accompany a trafficker, engage in prostitution or domestic or factory
labor, or enter into a commercial marriage. Second, by virtue of its
agnosticism toward the possibility of consent-i.e., by not penalizing,
for example, procurement of a woman with her consent-the GAATW
framework appears to adopt a normative position that would allow-or
at least not object to-a woman's involvement in consensual traffick-
ing, prostitution, domestic labor, and commercial marriage.7 3 Both
possibilities have provoked much divisiveness within the anti-traffick-
ing movement, particularly with respect to normative debates over
whether or not women should be able to engage in consensual prosti-
tution or consensual trafficking.
As will be discussed in the following section, too much attention to
the normative question of whether a woman should be able to consent
to trafficking and prostitution overlooks the empirical fact that women
actually do consent to these practices,7 4 and, moreover, risks neglecting
important descriptive facts regarding the quality of a woman's consent
to these practices. This oversight threatens to subsume the important
distinction between, for instance, a woman who consents to prostitu-
tion, and a woman who consents to prostitution under debt-bondage.
Becoming mired in debates over whether or not women should be able
to consent to prostitution could overlook the different kinds of coercive
forces that could potentially influence her consent, and divert attention
73. The normative position one takes with respect to the permissibility of consensual prosti-
tution and consensual trafficking can lead to the promotion of different legal measures. For
instance, with respect to prostitution, those who adhere to a normative stance against consensual
prostitution might support prohibiting prostitution and penalizing women who choose to engage
in prostitution, or they might favor penalizing only clients and procurers in an attempt to preclude
women from consenting to prostitution. On the other hand, those who adopt a normative position
that allows for consensual prostitution might object to penalization of the women and their clients
or procurers, and, instead, support only penalization of those involved in subjecting a woman to
forced prostitution. With respect to trafficking, those who maintain a normative stance against
consensual trafficking might support distinguishing trafficking victims from other illegal mi-
grants, and favor providing additional protections to the former. Conversely, those who adopt the
opposite stance might support treating those who consent to trafficking differently from those
who are forcibly trafficked, treating the former as they would other illegal migrants.
74. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 13.
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away from an actual source of the exploitation. For instance, in the case
of a woman forced into prostitution who was deceived by a trafficker's
lure of an attractive waitressing job abroad, or a woman who intended
to engage in self-regulated prostitution and found herself in a debt-
bondage situation, the source of exploitation might be misinformation
or debt-bondage, respectively. Deeming consent irrelevant to the women's
victimization also risks portraying women as perennial victims of false
consciousness, incapable of making autonomous choices regarding their
means of migration and employment.
On the other hand, the practical advantage of considering consent
irrelevant to a woman's victimization by these practices lies in the
potential correlation between a state's willingness to accord protections
and the perceived degree of the woman's victimization. In other words,
the greater the extent to which women are portrayed as victims-
which is more likely to be the case where consent is irrelevant-the
more inclined a state might be to accord these women substantive legal
protections.
i. Consent to Prostitution
Advocates debate whether or not the decision to engage in prosti-
tution could ever be the result of free choice. Some argue that whether
forced by a lack of money, housing, or employment, or threat of
violence, these women would not otherwise choose to prostitute them-
selves. 75 Others insist that even if conditions were such that a woman
were able to self-regulate her activities, a woman conceivably might
still choose prostitution as her profession.7 6 These advocates claim that,
although prostitution may presently seem to be an undesirable occu-
pation since prostitution, as with other societal institutions, has been
rendered exploitative by social and political inequality, prostitution as
a profession is not inherently or necessarily exploitative.
Assuming that it would be possible to choose freely to engage in
prostitution, the normative question of whether women should be able
to consent to prostitution remains a controversial issue. The contro-
versy arises from debates regarding whether or not the physical act of
prostitution is inherently exploitative. Those who argue that women
should not be allowed to consent to prostitution argue from the view
that prostitution is inherently exploitative-whether as an act of vio-
lence against women's bodies, or as a practice which, by commodifying
women's bodies and sexuality, reinforces traditional hierarchical power
75. For discussion of this debate, see Reanda, supra note 32, at 202.
76. See Carol H. Hauge, Prostitution of Women and International Human Rights Law: Transforming
Exploitation into Equality, 8 N.Y. Irr'L L. REv. 23, 24 (1995).
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structures premised on male dominance.77 On the other hand, those
who argue that women should be permitted to consent to prostitution
base their argument on the belief that prostitution does not necessarily
operate as an instrument of women's oppression, but rather can be a
viable economic option, if not an expression of women's equality or an
act of sexual self-determination. 78
The normative debates over whether women should be permitted to
consent to prostitution tend to derail efforts to combat the forced or
slavery-like conditions under which a prostitute may work. In particu-
lar, the normative position against consensual prostitution threatens to
conflate the question of whether or not the physical act of prostitution
itself is inherently exploitative with the question of whether or not one
has consented to the conditions under which one engages in prostitu-
tion. Deeming consent impossible and treating prostitution as an
inherently exploitative physical act risks dismissing the fact that some
women actually do choose to engage in prostitution,7 9 but do not
consent to the abusive conditions to which they are subjected in the
course of their work. Consequently, attention can be diverted from
efforts to eradicate the abusive living and working conditions to which
prostitutes may be subjected.
While some might argue that this distinction is a semantic differ-
ence relevant only to the description of the exploitation, the distinction
has important practical implications for victims of non-sexual forced
labor/slavery-like practices. Emphasis on the inherent exploitation caused
by the physical act of prostitution rather than on the forced conditions
of the prostitution activity creates a problematic distinction between
forced prostitution and other forced labor and slavery-like practices.
For example, to the extent that attention is drawn away from the
coercive conditions of forced labor/slavery-like practices, domestic workers,
whose vulnerability to abuse lies primarily in their working conditions,
could receive lesser protections under international laws against trafficking
and forced labor/slavery-like practices. Domestic labor does not raise
the same concerns as prostitution with respect to whether the activity
is inherently exploitative as a physical act. However, domestic labor
does implicate the same concerns as prostitution with respect to the
way in which the activity is organized-as either self-regulated or
controlled by another person in an exploitative manner. Creating an
inherent distinction between prostitution and other forms of forced
labor/slavery-like practices, therefore, could work against the move-
77. See id. at 23.
78. See id. at 24; see also Reanda, supra note 32, at 202 (discussing whether prostitution
constitutes a human rights violation).
79. See supra Pyne's description of "voluntary" prostitution at note 13.
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ment to expand the definition of trafficking to include trafficking for
non-sexual forced labor/slavery-like practices.
ii. Consent to Trafficking
Debates over the significance of consent also occur with respect to
trafficking, or the recruitment or transportation of women for forced
labor/slavery-like practices, although the trafficking debates tend to be
less morally charged8° and differ slightly from those over prostitution.
Whereas the prostitution debates threaten to subsume the distinction
between prostitution and forced prostitution-drawing attention away
from the latter problem-the trafficking debates draw attention to
trafficking by problematizing trafficking as distinct from the broader
category of illegal immigration. This difference in focus, notwithstand-
ing, a comparison between the prostitution and trafficking debates is
useful because these two debates share similar argumentation regarding
the significance of consent as potentially dispositive of a woman's
victimization by these respective practices.
As with its definition of forced labor/slavery-like practices, the
GAATW definition of trafficking requires some form of coercion in the
recruitment or transportation of the woman.8 In contrast, the United
Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") definition of trafficking does not
require coercion as a necessary element of the violation:
[Trafficking is defined as the] illicit and clandestine move-
ment of persons across national or international borders, largely
from developing countries and some countries with econo-
mies in transition, with the end goal of forcing women and
girl children into sexually or economically oppressive and
exploitative situations for the profit of recruiters, traffickers
and crime syndicates, as well as other illegal activities related
to trafficking, such as forced domestic labour, false marriages,
clandestine employment and false adoption.82
By not requiring coercion, the UNGA definition does not appear to
admit the possibility that a woman could consent to the trafficking.
Based on its view that the act of recruitment is inherently exploitative,
80. Whereas those who view prostitution as inherently exploitative can invoke the imagery of
prostitution as a physical act of violence against women's bodies, those who view trafficking as
inherently exploitative lack recourse to such visceral representations. Instead, any inherently
exploitative nature of the trafficking lies in the ill intentions of the traffickers ultimately to place
a woman in the hands of someone who will subject her to forced labor/slavery-like practices.
81. Coercion includes "violence or threat of violence, abuse of authority or dominant position,
debt bondage, deception or other forms of coercion." See supra text accompanying note 59.
82. Report of the Special Rapportenr on Violence Against Women, supra note 2, at 19.
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the UNGA presumably would favor the view that women should not
be able to engage in consensual trafficking.83 To allow a woman to
consent to the trafficking would make it extremely difficult to distin-
guish trafficking from illegal migration, an outcome which the UNGA
views as unacceptable because a person's voluntary migration across
frontiers without authorization is substantively different from the traffick-
ing of a person with that person's consent. Unlike illegal migration,
trafficking occurs through the instrumentality of another person, and
has the end purpose of forcing the person into a forced living or
working situation.
On one hand, the UNGA distinction between illegal migration and
trafficking carries the advantage of focusing attention on the violation
of the woman's rights, rather than on the illegality of her act.8 4 In other
words, to consider a woman who consents to be trafficked as simply
engaging in illegal migration risks treating the woman as a collabora-
tor of the trafficker and risks overlooking the trafficker's underlying
self-serving and possibly malevolent purposes. Relatedly, acknow-
ledging the distinction between trafficking and illegal migration yields
the practical benefit of encouraging states to provide trafficked women
protections that states might otherwise deny to illegal immigrants. In
the absence of this distinction, states might argue that a woman who
consented to the trafficking, as with any other illegal migrant, does
not deserve special protections for having knowingly violated state
sovereignty by illegal border-crossing.8 5 A state could use this argu-
ment to deny protections to a woman who consented to be trafficked,
but was later subjected to a forced or slavery-like living or working
situation. 816
83. In its report to the 50th session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations commented that:
The question must be asked . . . whether trafficking is the same as illegal migration.
It would seem that the two are related, but different. Migration across frontiers without
documentation does not have to be coerced or exploitative. At the same time, persons
can be trafficked with their consent. A distinction could be made in terms of tile
purpose for which borders are crossed and whether movement occurs through the
instrumentality of another person. Under this distinction, trafficking of women and
girls would be defined in terms of "the end goal of forcing women and girl children
into sexually or economically oppressive and exploitative situations" and the fact that
it is done "for the profit of recruiters, traffickers and crime syndicates."
See NOTRAF, Background Study, supra note 42, § 2.4.
84. Similarly, in the prostitution context, a focus on the abusive conditions under which a
forced prostitute works could draw attention away from the illegality of her activity in countries
that prohibit prostitution.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 108-111.
86. Indeed, a woman who also initially intended to engage in illegal but voluntary prostitution
in the destination country, but ended up in a forced prostitution situation, could be denied
protections by the state on grounds that, in addition to intending to immigrate illegally, she
intended to engage in another crime once within the destination country.
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On the other hand, maintaining the distinction between trafficking
and illegal immigration sacrifices belief in a woman's autonomy to
migrate to another country or region. The UNGA view appears to deny
paternalistically the possibility that a woman might consciously and
freely choose to use a trafficker for the purposes of her own migration.
To consider such consent, if not impossible, at least irrelevant to the
determination of whether a woman has been victimized by trafficking,
the UNGA sets up a distinction between trafficking and illegal migra-
tion that could be difficult to justify. The UNGA's exclusion of a
coercion requirement thus implies that, if the trafficking were to occur
with the woman's consent, the mere fact of the trafficker's ill-purpose,
even if ultimately unexecuted, would violate her rights in a way that
straightforward illegal migration would not. In response, one might
argue that ill-intent constitutes weak grounds for distinguishing be-
tween trafficking and illegal migration, and even weaker justification
for providing women who consent to trafficking special protections
that would be denied to other illegal migrants. Besides, one might
argue, requiring more than mere ill-intent would still allow women
who consent to trafficking some measure of protection. Even if by
consenting to the trafficking, the woman might indeed become the
object of the ill-intentions of the trafficker to subject her to forced
labor/slavery-like practices, these ill-intentions would translate to a
victimization of the woman only if the trafficker were to succeed in
delivering her into the intended exploitative living or working situ-
ation. If the trafficker were successful, the woman would still receive
protections as a victim of forced labor or slavery-like practices, though
perhaps not as a victim of abusive recruitment.
Hence, in both the prostitution and the trafficking contexts, the
issue of whether to require coercion as a material element of these
practices gives rise to difficult normative choices. Eliminating the
coercion requirement might render more women eligible to receive
protection and remedy under international laws against trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices. However, ridding the definitions of
the coercion requirement also risks treating women as perennial vic-
tims, incapable of making choices about their bodies and their means
of migration.
One's positions on whether to require a coercion element in the
definitions of prostitution and trafficking, respectively, may or may not
be consistent with each other. One might prefer to retain a coercion
requirement for prostitution, yet consider coercion irrelevant to the
question of whether one has been victimized by trafficking, or vice
versa. Assuming coercion to be relevant to the determination of whether
a woman has been victimized by trafficking and/or forced labor/slav-
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ery-like practices, the following section discusses the complex question
of how coercion is to be assessed.
b. The Identification of Coercion
Critical to the determination of whether the circumstances of a
woman's decision to engage in prostitution, domestic labor, or marriage
amount to the requisite level of coercion are two fundamental ques-
tions: (1) procedurally, at what point in a sequence of events is coercion
or a lack of consent dispositive of a woman's victimization; and (2) more
substantively, what constitutes coercion or lack of consent. The com-
plexity of these inquiries can perhaps best be illustrated with reference
to what will be referred to in the Article as the "Re-entry Scenario."
The Re-entry Scenario describes the situation of a woman who, having
escaped or having been released from debt bondage as a forced prosti-
tute, "voluntarily" decides to re-enter the trafficking industry as a
prostitute, believing that alternative forms of employment would be
unavailable to her due to the social stigma against former prostitutes.
The fact that the woman was initially trafficked and forced into pros-
titution gives rise to the question of when in the trafficking scenario
the lack of a woman's consent becomes dispositive of her status as
victim. Furthermore, the possibility that the woman's decision to
re-enter prostitution in this scenario may have been driven by eco-
nomic hardship gives rise to the substantive question of what consti-
tutes coercion. The following section aims to explore both these issues
in more detail and to assess their implications for the anti-trafficking
movement.
i. The Timing of Consent
One commentator has noted that the question of a woman's free will
is, in part, an issue of timing, or the determination of what point in
the trafficking and/or forced labor scenario intent should be meas-
ured.87 This question suggests at least two possibilities: first, an ap-
proach that focuses on original intent; and second, an approach that
focuses on the immediate conditions of a woman's situation and her
ability to change them. These two approaches to the timing of consent
yield inconsistent outcomes, the ramifications of which could drasti-
cally affect the range of victims eligible for protections under interna-
tional standards against trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like prac-
tices.
87. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 187.
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If, on the one hand, one were to adopt an approach based on original
intent, the label "forced prostitution" would apply only to women who
never intended to work as prostitutes. For instance, if intent were to
be measured at the time the trafficker or procurer approached her, then
the woman in the Re-entry Scenario, having never intended to enter
into prostitution, would still be considered a forced prostitute because
of the initial coercion, despite her current willingness to continue
prostituting herself. Conversely, a woman who had initially consented
to engage in prostitution, even if she were currently prostituting under
forced conditions, would not be considered a forced prostitute.
If, on the other hand, one were to adopt an approach that focused
on the immediate circumstances under which the woman works and
her ability to change these conditions, the label "forced prostitute"
would apply to any woman prostituting under forced conditions, irre-
spective of her original intentions.88 This approach has been analogized
to date rape doctrine: regardless of whether the woman intended to
have sex when she agreed to go to the man's apartment, her actions
there determine whether the sex act would be classified as date rape or
consensual sex. 89 For example, the immediate conditions analysis would
consider a forced prostitute any woman currently prostituting under
forced conditions, even if her initial entry into prostitution was con-
sensual. On the contrary, if applied to the Re-entry Scenario, the
immediate conditions analysis would hold that, even though the woman
was forced to prostitute initially, she is now "voluntarily" engaging in
prostitution, and is therefore no longer a victim of forced prostitu-
tion.90
The immediate conditions analysis has the obvious advantage of
according protections to women currently being victimized by forced
labor/slavery-like practices, whereas the original intent analysis has the
counterintuitive effect of denying protections to these women based on
the woman's original intent to enter into an activity which only later
became corrupted by forced labor/slavery-like conditions. The disad-
vantage, however, of the immediate conditions analysis is that it could
fail to take adequately into account how the fact of an initial coercion
might have affected the range of options currently available to the
woman. For instance, with respect to the woman in the Re-entry
88. See id. at 188 (citing Lan Cao, Note, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO Proposal, 96
YALE LJ. 1297, 1297 n.1 (1987)). Note that the focus on the immediate conditions under which
a woman works would also provide fewer burden of proof problems than would an original intent
analysis.
89. See id.
90. Note that this analysis assumes that economic hardship does not constitute coercion. For
an argument based on the opposite assumption, see discussion of the Re-entry Scenario in the
following section. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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Scenario, one could argue that the immediate conditions analysis fails
to consider how the woman's past prostitution activities probably
limited the range of economic options subsequently available to her
due to the social stigma attached to her former prostitution activities.
Unless this woman could argue that extreme economic hardship con-
stituted coercion, this woman would not be considered a victim of
forced labor/slavery-like practices under the immediate conditions analy-
sis. Hence, in this limited respect, the original intent analysis carries
the benefit of rendering the initial coercion dispositive of the woman's
victimization and providing the woman in the Re-entry Scenario pro-
tections accordingly.
While, in most circumstances, the original intent analysis clearly
yields less beneficial outcomes from the victim's perspective than does
the immediate conditions analysis, it is useful to realize how, from the
state's perspective, this analysis is useful in gauging the culpability and
consequent entitlement to protections of a particular victim. For in-
stance, a state might argue that, as between two women currently
being forced to prostitute-one woman having known at the time she
was trafficked that she would be engaging in prostitution, and the
other woman having believed that she would be waitressing in the
destination country-the latter would be more entitled to protections
and remedies. Whereas the former entered the state fully intending to
violate the state's laws against prostitution, the latter had no such
intent to commit a crime once within the state's territory. Accordingly,
a state could find reason to deny or lessen the protections to the former
based on her original intent.
Hence, from the perspective of victim protection, the immediate
conditions analysis has significant advantages over the original intent
analysis, with the exception of its application to situations such as the
Re-entry Scenario, in which the presence or absence of original intent
could have effectuated the presence or absence of immediate intent. In
this scenario, the initial coercion of the woman into forced prostitution
created a subsequent situation of economic hardship-i.e., the fact of
the woman's former prostitution activities caused her to be socially
ostracized, which, in turn, prevented her from finding and partaking
in other forms of employment. If, however, economic hardship were to
be considered a form of coercion under the definition of forced la-
bor/slavery-like practices, the immediate conditions analysis would
consider the woman in the Re-entry Scenario a victim of forced pros-
titution. Hence, as will be discussed in the following section, the
underinclusiveness of the immediate conditions analysis might be coun-
tered with a broader definition of coercion that would account for the
lingering effects of past coercion in creating a present coercion.
1998 / Trafficking in Women
ii. The Substance of Consent
The immediate conditions analysis of the Re-entry Scenario aptly
illustrates how the question of whether or not economic hardship
constitutes a form of coercion can drastically affect the outcome of the
analysis. As discussed above, under an assumption that economic hard-
ship does not constitute coercion, the woman in the Re-entry Scenario
would not be considered a victim of forced prostitution. However, the
opposite assumption would call into question whether or not the
"choice" to re-enter prostitution was genuinely voluntary in the context
of extreme hardship.91 For instance, had job training programs been
available to these women as part of an effort to facilitate their reinte-
gration into mainstream society, perhaps these women would have had
a viable opportunity to leave prostitution and pursue some other means
of survival.
The current proposed definitions of trafficking and forced labor/slav-
ery-like practices differ in the extent to which economic hardship
serves as an indicator of coercion. For instance, the GAATW definitions
do not explicitly identify economic coercion in their list of coercive
factors: "violence or threat of violence, abuse of authority or dominant
position, debt bondage, deception or other forms of coercion."92 Ad-
mittedly, "other forms of coercion" could be construed to include
economic coercion. However, given that GAATW probably was famil-
iar with the debates over whether or not prostitution is inherently
exploitative and with the claims that economic conditions are a source
of that exploitation, one could interpret the absence of "economic
coercion" in the list to be the result of a conscious exclusion. Indeed,
in elaborating on the meaning of "violence or threat of violence,"
"deception," "abuse of authority," and "debt-bondage and practices
similar to debt-bondage" in its definitions of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices, NOTRAF, a network of European organi-
zations which includes member organizations of the GAATW, makes
no mention of economic coercion.93 In contrast, the UNGA at least
91. Indeed, case histories compiled by Human Rights Watch/Asia indicate that there are a
number of women who feel that after having been forced to work in a brothel, their only
alternative is to continue prostituting themselves. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
92. See GAATW: Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 59, at 1.
93. In its Basic Principles for a Code of Conduat, NOTRAF explains that
[florce can take various forms, including, but not limited to:
a violence or threat of violence, including deprivation of freedom (e.g., of movement, or
personal choice);
* deeption, inter alia with regard to working conditions and/or the nature of the work
to be done;
* abuse of authority, ranging from confiscation of personal documents to bringing or
keeping a person in a position of dependence by abusing one's dominant social position
or abusing the vulnerable position of persons without legal status;
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acknowledges economic need to be a contributing factor of trafficking.
The UNGA offered, in 1994, the following definition of trafficking:
[The] illicit and clandestine movement of persons across na-
tional or international borders, largely from developing countries
with economies in transition, with the end goal of forcing women
and girl children into sexually or economically oppressive and
exploitative situations for the profit of recruiters, traffickers
and crime syndicates, as well as other illegal activities related
to trafficking, such as forced domestic labour, false marriages,
clandestine employment and false adoption.94
By describing trafficking as a phenomenon that originates largely in
developing countries and economies in transition, and by including
"economically oppressive" situations in its description of the end goals
of trafficking, the UNGA acknowledges the role of economics in both
the recruitment process and the exploitative living and working con-
ditions.
While including economic hardship as a form of coercion certainly
would increase the number of trafficked women eligible for protection
under international law, it would be difficult, as a practical matter, to
identify clearly the level of economic hardship sufficient to constitute
coercion. Given the universal role that economic considerations play in
decisionmaking, there would have to be a fairly specific measure of
hardship. If, for instance, the baseline were economic equality between
men and women, most women would be considered victims or poten-
tial victims, given their generally lower economic status relative to
men. Unlike physical or emotional coercion, defining economic coer-
cion poses the far more complex task of developing a comprehensive
understanding of the socio-economic factors that can influence women's
decisionmaking.
4. A Conflict of Paradigms
Definitional difficulties aside, the reluctance to include economic
hardship as a form of coercion in the GAATW definitions may stem,
in part, from a desire to call attention to the contributions women
make to the informal sector of the economy, as opposed to the unfor-
* debt-bondage andpraices similar to debt-bondage, i.e., pledging the personal services or
labour of a person as security for a debt, if the value of those services or labour as
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt, or the length
and nature of those services or labour are not limited and defined.
NOTRAF, Basic Principles for a Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at 2.
94. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis
added).
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tunate circumstances that may have motivated them to turn to this
sector for employment. This difference in focus, in turn, may reflect
an acceptance of the practical reality that, in many countries, socio-
economic conditions force women to turn to these sectors for employ-
ment and that this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, the GAATW definitions might preference strate-
gies which aim to eliminate the coercive conditions of their employ-
ment, as opposed to those which aim to eradicate these forms of
employment altogether. This same underlying concern may have mo-
tivated the GAATW to adopt a normative position in favor of allowing
women to be able to engage in consensual prostitution and trafficking.
The position one adopts regarding these coercion issues, as well as
the other definitional issues discussed earlier in this Part, ultimately
may derive from the operation of two distinct assumptions regarding
women's role in society, or, rather, the role society allows women to
play. One paradigm, which could be referred to as the "empowerment
model," is premised on the belief in a woman's autonomy, especially
her capacity to choose to engage in certain activities that could place
her in a position of vulnerability-i.e., consent to prostitution and
consent to trafficking. To the extent that these activities render her
vulnerable to exploitation by others, the empowerment model encour-
ages the development of strategies to address the sources of such
external exploitation, rather than to eradicate these activities alto-
gether. For instance, the empowerment model might encourage lobby-
ing efforts aimed at the development of labor standards applicable to
prostitution, domestic labor, and factory labor. At the local level, the
empowerment model might invite proactive efforts to establish pro-
grams that empower women to combat and overcome victimization,
such as special employment training programs for jobs in the formal
sector.
In contrast, another paradigm, which could be referred to as the
"protection model," focuses on eliminating any potential source of the
exploitation of women, and rather than support activities that might
leave women vulnerable to external exploitation, aims to eradicate
these activities altogether. For instance, the protection model might
endorse lobbying efforts directed at increased restrictions on interna-
tional migration, as well as the abolition of prostitution. The protec-
tion model might also favor the formulation of measures which address
problems that immediately arise out of the victimization of these
women by forced labor/slavery-like practices, such as the provision of
shelter and medical care to these victims.
Although the measures adopted by either approach need not be
mutually exclusive, they differ in important respects. For instance, in
addition to the measures described above, the protection model might
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also support the establishment of training programs for victims, and
the empowerment model might also support the provision of medical
care and shelter. However, these models likely would diverge with
respect to the focus of their broader lobbying efforts. Since these two
approaches view the fundamental nature of the exploitation of these
women by trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices differ-
ently-i.e., the protection model viewing the exploitation as intrinsic
to the employment, and the empowerment model viewing the exploi-
tation as externally imposed-proponents of these two models would
have difficulty agreeing on a strategy to eliminate the source of the
exploitation. Therefore, while the empowerment model might favor an
approach that seeks to shelter women from the exploitative conditions
of their employment (e.g., debt-bondage) the protection model might
encourage approaches aimed at eliminating certain forms of employ-
ment altogether (e.g., prostitution per se).
Both models have their respective advantages and disadvantages. For
instance, one could argue that the protection model seems less likely
to succeed, as a practical matter, since it is improbable that any
campaign could completely abolish prostitution, and might actually
force prostitution further underground, particularly in the absence of
viable alternatives to prostitution. At the same time, one could argue
in favor of the protection model on grounds that, often, a woman
ultimately subjected to trafficking or forced labor/slavery-like practices
was never in a position to effect autonomous decisions-i.e., her socio-
economic conditions largely predetermined which choices she viewed
as possible and potentially favorable-and, therefore, should be pro-
tected from making decisions that could lead to her exploitation.
While this assignment of a "false consciousness" might offend some
western feminists, if given a choice between the empowerment model
and the protection model, the potential and actual victims of these
practices might favor the latter for the wider cast of its safety net.
Hence, adherence to one model over the other not only turns on one's
substantive perception of the nature of the exploitation, but may differ
according to one's position in relation to the actual victimization.
III. CONFLICTS OF LAWS--INTERNATIONAL
ANTI-TRAFFICKING/FORCED PROSTITUTION LAWS VS.
DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION AND ANTI-PROSTITUTION
LAWS
Even assuming the satisfactory resolution of the various issues in-
volved in redefining trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices,
lax enforcement of international legal standards threatens to prevent
the realization of these legal protections. In particular, domestic immi-
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gration and prostitution laws that penalize trafficked women for illegal
immigration or prostitution can undermine the protections otherwise
accorded to victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices
under international law. The practical significance of this threat is
reflected by the fact that these victims often are reluctant to seek help
from local authorities for fear of being arrested for illegally immigrat-
ing or for engaging in prostitution. These victims may believe that a
threat exists either within the countries to which they have been
trafficked, or in the communities to which they may be deported.95
These concerns are not unfounded, given the practical realities af-
fecting the enforcement of international law. As a primary matter,
many states are reluctant to defer to international law,96 particularly
when at the expense of retaining domestic legal standards. 97 Even
where a state purportedly accedes to international legal standards, there
is no guarantee that its local law enforcement authorities would defer
or conform to the international norm. Indeed, Article 12 of the 1949
Convention permits states to defer to domestic legal standards in the
enforcement of its provisions, stating that the 1949 Convention does
not affect the principle that the offenses to which it refers "shall in
each State be defined, prosecuted, and punished in conformity with its
domestic law."98 The absence of a provision that explicitly prohibits
the prosecution of trafficking and forced prostitution victims for vio-
lating de-nestic immigration and prostitution laws opens the door to
further victimization of these women.
A. Domestic Immigration Laws
As discussed in Part I, many victims of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices have illegally immigrated to the countries
in which they live and work and, consequently, risk being prosecuted
or deported under domestic immigration laws. For some, deportation
to their native communities would subject them to further criminal
liability under the emigration and prostitution laws of their native
countries. Moreover, the social stigma and shame some victims would
suffer upon return to their native communities after having been
95. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
96. For a discussion of the different approaches states have taken with respect to balancing
international and domestic law within a single legal order, see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CoNTExT: LAws, PoLTIcs, MoRAls 725-41
(1996).
97. The history of the 1949 Convention is particularly telling in this respect. Many of the
States Parties to the early anti-trafficking instruments refused to accede to the 1949 Convention
due to a perception that, by addressing prostitution within state borders, the Convention
encroached on states' domestic jurisdictions. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
98. 1949 Convention, supra note 40, art. 12, at 278.
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subjected to forced labor/slavery-like practices-forced prostitution, in
particular--could lead to their social and economic ostracization and
further compound their victimization. This situation underscores the
necessity of creating international protections against liability and, in
some cases, against deportation of these women.
The 1949 Convention addresses the immigration issue only to the
extent of requiring that States Parties take measures to prevent immi-
gration for the purposes of trafficking, and to repatriate women who
have been trafficked for purposes of prostitution. 99 The 1949 Conven-
tion does not prohibit states from prosecuting trafficking victims for
their status as undocumented aliens. Given the absence of such a
prohibition, coupled with the Article 12 recognition of States Parties'
prerogative to define, prosecute, and punish offenses in the 1949
Convention in conformity with domestic laws, 100 a state could avoid
providing the substantive protections which would be accorded under
the 1949 Convention in the absence of conflicting domestic law by
simply deporting the victim in accordance with domestic immigration
law.
At present, the United Nations International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families' 01 ("Migrant Workers Convention") is the only international
instrument that comes close to providing rights to victims of interna-
tional trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices, although un-
der the rubric of rights accorded to undocumented aliens. However,
having only received seven signatories, the Migrant Workers Conven-
tion has not yet entered into force, and therefore is of limited authority
in international law, much less the domestic laws of most countries.
Moreover, even if the Migrant Workers Convention were in force, it
would offer only limited protections to these victims. Much as the
Article 12 deference to domestic law limits the protections applicable
to trafficking and forced prostitution victims under the 1949 Conven-
tion, the tension within the text of the Migrant Workers Convention
between the competing concerns of human rights protection of un-
documented workers and the interests of states in territorial sover-
eignty similarly threatens to undermine its capacity to address the
human rights abuses suffered by victims of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices. If not for this tension, trafficking victims
99. See id. arts. 17 & 19, at 282. Article 17 discusses immigration issues only at the level of
prevention of trafficking, rather than as a solution to a trafficking victim's immigration status
problem. See id. art. 17, at 282. Note also that Article 6, which requires States Parties to repeal
or abolish "any existing law, regulation or administrative provision" under which people engaging
in prostitution are subject to special registration or required to have special documentation, makes
no mention of laws specific to the victim's immigration status. Id. art. 6, at 276.
100. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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could stand to benefit from a broad range of human rights protections
under the Migrant Workers Convention.
10 2
Unfortunately, juxtaposed against the Migrant Workers Conven-
tion's broadly enumerated protections for undocumented workers is the
Migrant Workers Convention's overriding commitment to states' sov-
ereign prerogatives to control immigration. This commitment threat-
ens to undermine or defeat the very rights the Migrant Workers
Convention potentially provides to victims of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices. Although Article 25 requires that "States
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant
workers are not deprived of any rights derived from this principle by
reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment," this provision
fails to specify which state actions adequately "ensure" against such
deprivation. 10 3 Moreover, Articles 34 and 79 could render Article 25
ineffective with respect to victims of trafficking and forced labor/slav-
ery-like practices, particularly forced prostitution.1°4 Articles 34 and
79 state, respectively:
Nothing in the present part of the Convention shall have the
effect of relieving migrant workers and the members of their
families from either the obligation to comply with the laws
and regulations of any State of transit and the State of em-
101. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Their Families, U.N.GAOR 3rd Comm., 45th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, at 1519, U.N.
Doc. AIRESI45/158 (1991) [hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
102. Because trafficking victims often are illegal aliens in the countries in which they work,
the most relevant provisions of the Migrant Workers Convention are those that protect undocu-
mented or "irregular" migrant workers. Article 2 of the Migrant Workers Convention defines
"migrant worker" as a person "who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national." Id. art. 2(1), at 1523. Linda
Bosniak interprets the Migrant Workers Convention as defining irregular migrant workers as
"people who have arrived in the state of employment or residence without authorization, who are
employed there without permission, or who entered with permission and have remained after the
expiration of their visas." Linda S. Bosniak, Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of
Undocumented Migrants Under the International Migrant Workers Convention, 25 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 737, 742 (1991); see also Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 101, art. 5, at 1525.
Under the "irregular migrant workers" rubric, articles relevant to victims of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices include the right to not be subjected to torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 10); the right not to be held in slavery
or servitude, and not to be required to perform forced or compulsory labor (Article 11); and the
right to effective protection by the states against violence, physical injury, threats and intimida-
tion, whether by public officials or by private individuals, groups or institutions (Article 16(2)).
See Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 101, arts. 10, 11, and 16(2), at 1526, 1528.
103. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 101, art. 25, at 1532.
104. One could argue that some forced prostitutes also should be considered migrant workers
because they engage in remunerated activity and, moreover, because there is no explicit require-
ment that the "work" in which the undocumented migrant engages be a legal activity. However,
it is unlikely that the Migrant Workers Convention would apply to victims of commercial
marriage, as these victims would not be engaging in a remunerated activity.
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ployment or the obligation to respect the cultural identity of
the inhabitants of such States. 10 5
and
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect the right of
each State Party to establish the criteria governing admission
of migrant workers and members of their families. 10 6
Hence, these provisions, in effect, reaffirm the prerogative of States
Parties to enforce their domestic laws concerning unauthorized entry,
employment, or residence against the victims of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices. In the absence of an additional article
explicitly prohibiting the prosecution of undocumented migrants for
immigration violations based on testimony or other information ob-
tained in the course of the migrants' attempt to claim protections
under the Migrant Workers Convention, trafficking victims would risk
exposing themselves to expulsion with any attempt to avail themselves
of the protection of the state for abuses they suffered at the hands of
their employers. Moreover, even if contacting the state's immigration
officials in response to a trafficking victim's exercise of a right under
the Migrant Workers Convention were prohibited under this proposed
article, a state would not be likely to forego prosecuting a trafficking
victim for violations of its immigration laws simply because the vic-
tim's employer might also be subject to prosecution. 10 7
Not only do domestic immigration laws deter victims of trafficking
and forced labor/slavery-like practices from reporting the abuses they
have suffered, but these laws also may further victimize these women
by requiring their deportation. For some victims of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices, the fundamental conflict these vic-
tims have with domestic immigration laws is not based merely on a
personal preference for remaining in their country of employment, but
rather the practical impossibility of returning home without facing
re-victimization. As discussed above in Part I of this article, for some
victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices, particu-
larly those forced into prostitution, returning to their native countries
is a dangerous and painful alternative, as the social stigma attached to
105. Id. art. 34, at 1535.
106. Id. art. 79, at 1550.
107. See Bosniak, supra note 102, at 761. Bosniak also notes that a migrant worker who has
been expelled or is in detention is nor well-situated to vindicate her employment rights. In
addition, the mere threat that an employer might notify immigration officials of her undocu-
mented status is often enough to convince a migrant worker, such as a trafficking victim, to
relinquish the exercise of her rights. See id.
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their having been a prostitute could lead to social and economic
ostracization by their families and communities. While the additional
article, proposed above, might bolster Article 25 protections, this
article would provide only a temporary solution for these victims. Even
assuming, under this proposed article, that local officials were prohib-
ited from prosecuting trafficking victims for illegal immigration based
on information gained from her reporting abuses to the authorities,
these victims could, nevertheless, be subject to prosecution for illegal
immigration in other contexts-for instance, upon being discovered in
a brothel raid.
A comprehensive approach to protecting the victims of trafficking,
therefore, would require the prophylactic measure of providing traffick-
ing victims residency status in the country to which they have been
trafficked or in which they have been subjected to forced labor/slavery-
like practices. However, the prominent role that state territorial sov-
ereignty has played in international legal and political systems creates
a serious obstacle to according undocumented victims of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices adequate protections under inter-
national law. Despite variations in the legal and social treatment of
undocumented aliens from state to state, one common feature is the
presupposition that an alien's presence results from a breach or a
failure of national territorial borders. 08 In practice, protections
available to individuals who are legally in the country can be
denied to undocumented aliens on the basis of territorial sovereignty,
or a state's competence to "prescribe and apply law to persons, things
and events within its territorial domain to the exclusion of other
states." 0 9 A state's power to refuse immigrants entry and to expel
aliens has been integral to its territorial sovereignty since the nine-
teenth century.110
Reflective of the general tendency under international law to exclude
undocumented aliens from fundamental rights and freedoms, various
human rights instruments contain restrictions on the rights of aliens,
allowing entry of aliens to be conditioned on the country's consent."'
A state's gate-keeping power to "determine the composition of the
community to which state obligations are owed" is considered a legiti-
mate justification for unequal protection of aliens' human rights.112
108. See id. at 742.
109. See id. at 743 (quoting LuNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAw 117 (1989)).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 743 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 13);
American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 22(6) and (9)); African Charter on Human
Rights (Articles 12(4) and (5)); and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 4 of
the Fourth Protocol)).
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While, as human beings, aliens theoretically are entitled to treatment
which complies with internationally recognized human rights stand-
ards, states are not required to treat aliens identically with citizens. 113
Although the idea of providing residency status seems radical when
viewed against the backdrop of the general reluctance of states to
accord undocumented aliens protection, the proposal is not a novel one.
In a 1989 resolution, the European Parliament recommended the pro-
vision of residency status for women whose personal safety might be
endangered upon return to their homeland, or who, upon arrival,
might again become victims of exploitation.' 1 4 In 1993, the European
Parliament expanded these measures, calling upon Member States to
provide permanent residency status in cases in which the victim's per-
sonal safety would be endangered upon return to her home country.115
Along the same lines, the GAATW Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Victims of Trafficking in Persons ("Standard Minimum
Rules") 1 6 prohibits treatment of trafficked persons as illegal immi-
grants, and, instead, requires that the destination state provide resi-
dency status to the trafficked person in order to ensure that she has
the option of legal recourse.1 7 Following the GAATW example, the
governments of Belgium and the Netherlands have amended their laws
112. Bosniak, supra note 102, at 755.
113. Examples of this distinction include Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), granting certain political participation rights to citizens; and
Article 12, granting freedom of movement to those legally within the territory; and Article 13,
providing procedural safeguards for expulsion of lawful aliens. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 54-55, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Meanwhile, Article 2(3) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") empowers states to
determine the extent to which they will guarantee the ICESCR's economic rights to non-nationals.
See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). In addition, Article 2(2) calls for
non-discrimination in the application of ICESCR provisions based on a fixed list of "protected"
traits, which does not include nationality. See Kevin Yamaga-Karns, Pressing Japan: Illegal Foreign
Workers under International Human Rights Law and the Role of Cultural Relativisms, 30 TEx. INT'L
LJ. 559, 565 (1995). Similarly, Article 1(2) of the International Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination ("CERD") provides that CERD "shall not apply to distinctions, exclu-
sions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to [CERD] between citizens and non-citi-
zens." International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
114. Demleiner, supra note 1, at 179. The Resolution also urged E.C. Member States to accede
to the 1949 Convention, suggested introducing or strengthening penalties against exploiters of
prostitution, and called for rehabilitative measures such as employment programs, shelters, social
rehabilitation, free health care, education, and training. Id. at 178-79.
115. NOTRAF, Background Study, supra note 42, § 2.3.
116. GAATW: Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 59.
117. Id., Rule 5. Rule 5 states:
In order to ensure the victim's ability to remain in the country during all proceedings
pursuant to having been a victim of trafficking and/or forced labour, slavery-like
practices, the victim shall, for the duration of his/her stay, be guaranteed:
e) Resident status, in order to take legal action against the offenders and to regain
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to provide temporary residency status to victims of trafficking who are
willing to pursue prosecution of their exploiters. 18
Though controversial, a compelling argument could be made for
providing residency status to trafficking victims, especially with re-
spect to those subjected to forced labor/slavery-like practices. The
standard argument against providing status, which holds that undocu-
mented workers are not entitled to the benefits of community mem-
bership (i.e., rights) because these workers "entered the state's territory
without state consent and in direct violation of the state's expressed
intention to condition entry upon consent,"" 9 would simply not apply
to trafficked women because their migration was coerced. Admittedly,
this particular argument would not be applicable to women subjected
to forced labor/slavery-like practices who were not also trafficked.
However, one could argue that non-trafficked victims of forced la-
bor/slavery-like practices nonetheless are entitled to rights because they
are de facto members of the national community due to their economic
contributions, and states and employers should not benefit from the
labor of victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices
without being required to accord them fundamental rights and protec-
tions. 120 Moreover, states receiving these women must bear at least part
of the responsibility for irregular migration because it is the states'
"persistent demand for migrant labor and their history of political and
economic penetration" into the workers' country of origin that causes
control over her/his life
f) Adequate and safe housing
g) Access to all [state-provided] health and social services
h) Adequate financial support
i) Opportunities for employment, education and training
Id. It is interesting to note that a prior draft of the GAATW Standard Minimum Rules explicitly
included a provision which required states to provide permanent residency status "if it is proved
that there is a danger to their well-being and this danger includes stigmatization or social
rejection on returning to the country of origin." Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women,
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons, INT'L CAMPAIGN NEWs BULLETIN
(STV Foundation Against Trafficking in Women, Netherlands), July 1995, at 6. In contrast, the
April 1997 Draft of the Standard Minimum Rules shifts the onus of protecting the victim from
social stigmatization to the state of origin under Rule 1(h). Specifically, Rule l(h) requires all
countries, including countries of destination, transit, and origin, to guarantee to all victims of
trafficking and forced labor and slavery-like practices that
[t]he victim's history of being trafficked and/or being subjected to forced labour and
slavery-like practices shall not be a matter of public or private record and shall not be
used against her, her family or friends in any way whatsoever, particularly with regard
to the right to freedom of travel, marriage, search for gainful employment.
GAATW Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 59, at 3.
See also infra text accompanying note 127, describing GAATW proposed rule allowing a duress
defense against criminal prosecution for offenses committed in part due to the victimization of
the woman by trafficking or forced labor/slavery-like practices.
118. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 2, at 26.
119. Bosniak, supra note 102, at 750.
120. Id.
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the migration. 121 In the long term, recognition of the rights of these
victims of trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices could cur-
tail irregular migration, as empowering these women with rights would
leave them less vulnerable to exploitation, and ultimately limit demand
for the type of labor that they provide. 122
B. Domestic Anti-Prostitution Laws
For trafficking victims who are subjected to forced prostitution, the
provision of residency status would provide only partial protection
against further victimization. In countries that prohibit prostitution, 23
victims of forced prostitution could be subject to prosecution for
having engaged in prostitution-in spite of the forced conditions of
their activity, and especially where local officials are complicit in the
trafficking and forced prostitution schemes. 124 Neither CEDAW nor
the 1949 Convention offer any recourse, both lacking provisions that
explicitly prohibit the prosecution of these victims for engaging in
prostitution. Moreover, the Article 12 recognition of states' prerogative
to define, prosecute, and punish in conformity with its domestic law,
could be interpreted so as to allow the prosecution of women engaging
in prostitution.125 In addition, the Migrant Workers Convention does
not explicitly address the vulnerability of women migrants to prosti-
tution and sexual abuse. Indeed, its Article 34 requirement that mi-
grant workers comply with the laws and regulations of the state of
employment could be construed to permit prosecution for prostitu-
tion.126
The GAATW Standard Minimum Rules offer limited protection
against prosecution for prostitution in the form of a possible defense
121. Id. See also discussion of economic colonialism in Marilyn Selby, Human Rights and
Undocumented Immigrant Workers in Japan, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 325, 356 (1989).
122. See Bosniak, supra note 102, at 748-49.
123. Note that countries approach the legality of prostitution differently. Countries have taken
three main approaches to dealing with prostitution: prohibition, abolition, and regulation. Some
countries, such as the United States (excluding Nevada), the Philippines, and Japan strictly
prohibit prostitution. However, other countries, such as Great Britain, Canada, Thailand, and
India, take an "abolitionist" approach, eliminating regulation and criminalizing trafficking, pro-
curement and brothel-keeping, but leaving prostitutes alone so long as they refrain from overt
soliciting. Meanwhile, "regulationist" countries consider prostitution a legal activity, but subject
the practice to a system of licensing and registration. See Reanda, supra note 32, at 203.
124. The issue of whether prostitution should be legalized is beyond the scope of this Article.
For more discussion on this topic, see Reanda, supra note 32, at 202-07; see gaterally Hauge, stpra
note 76. For a discussion of the influence of this debate on the feminist movement in Japan, see
The Movement Today: Difficult but Critical Issues (a dialogue with Ehara Yumiko, Nakajima Michiko,
Matsui Yayori, and Yunomae Tomoko), in VoicEs FROm THE JAPANESE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
38, 43-48 (edited by AMPO-Japan Asia Quarterly Review) [hereinafter VoicEs).
125. See supra text accompanying note 98.
126. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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against a criminal charge. These rules require that if the trafficked
person committed criminal acts during the time she was trafficked or
committed a crime in part due to the fact that she was trafficked or
subjected to forced labor/slavery-like practices, this would be "consid-
ered in any defense of duress or coercion raised by the victim during
the pre-trial and trial proceedings and as mitigation in sentencing if
convicted."'127 However, the option of using a defense of duress against
prosecution hardly provides a guarantee that such prosecution for
prostitution would not occur or that the woman would be successful
in mounting such a defense. For instance, a local judge could take into
account the coercion yet ultimately choose to proceed with the prose-
cution of the woman for illegal prostitution and ultimately convict her,
even though this activity was one which the woman was forced to
commit. The duress defense would be even more ineffective with
respect to a woman in the Re-entry Scenario who, having been a victim
of trafficking and forced prostitution in the past, is currently "volun-
tarily" engaging in prostitution, or working as a trafficker and brothel
owner herself,128 though this defense might be more effective if an
argument could be made that her current activities were still forced-
i.e., by economic coercion. 129
The problem posed by the potential conflict between international
laws against forced prostitution and domestic prohibitions against
prostitution per se mirrors the problem of potentially conflicting laws,
discussed above, in the immigration context. As was the case in the
immigration context, and for analogous rationales-i.e., the obligation
of the destination state to provide protections to victims of practices
from which the state might derive economic benefit-a comprehensive
solution to the problem posed by the capacity of states to prosecute
forced prostitution victims for prostitution would require a prophylac-
tic blanket prohibition against the prosecution of these women.
127. See GAATW: Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 59, Rule 14. Note that this provision
could operate to create a defense against criminal charges brought on grounds of illegal immi-
grarion. However, for the same reasons that this provision would accord inadequate protections
to victims of forced prostitution, discussed here, this provision would similarly prove of limited
use for victims of trafficking or forced labor/slavery-like practices indicted for illegal immigration.
128. For instance, the woman could argue, in her defense, that her acts, even if "voluntary,"
were committed "in part at least due to the fact that she was trafficked." Whether she could
successfully argue this, however, could depend on how long she was "voluntarily" prostituting-if
she were at the level of brothel keeper or trafficker, the mitigating effect of her once having been
a victim of trafficking would likely be attenuated.
129. See text accompanying supra notes 91-94.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Grounding discussions in the practical realities facing victims of
trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices, this Article has aimed
to redirect the traditional analysis of trafficking in women toward an
approach more attuned to the practical difficulties and normative im-
plications of current and proposed strategies for combating these prac-
tices. This Article has attempted to demonstrate how the inability of
the 1949 Convention to provide effective protection and remedies
against the newer manifestations of trafficking and forced labor/slav-
ery-like practices attests to the need for a reconceptualization of the
trafficking problem and a reformulation of the strategies necessary to
combat these practices. Efforts to redefine trafficking further require
challenging previous assumptions and rationales behind existing inter-
national anti-trafficking law and making difficult normative choices
regarding the treatment of women. In addition, efforts to develop
measures to ensure the enforcement of international laws against traffick-
ing and forced labor/slavery-like practices in the face of conflicting
domestic immigration and prostitution laws require the development
of special legal safeguards against the enforcement of these domestic
laws in a manner adverse to these victims.
While international legal standards and guidelines are meaningful
mechanisms with which to combat the problem of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices, they can only be effective where
political and social will support the enforcement of these international
legal norms, particularly where these norms threaten to restrict the
exercise of domestic laws. Whereas in some countries the role of law
may be to effect change, such that the mere passage of a law creates
societal consensus in favor of its terms, in other countries, the role of
law may be to reflect a pre-existing societal consensus on particular
issues. Where laws are not reflective of such a consensus, they are
ignored in practice.1 30 In the former context, the development of clear
laws based on informed policy decisions might be sufficient to eradicate
trafficking in women. In the latter context, however, it is important
to emphasize the critical role nongovernmental organizations can play
in effecting grassroots change, being well-positioned to garner the
popular support and societal consensus necessary for legal reform or
stricter enforcement of existing legal standards. 131
130. See, eg., Marilyn Selby, supra note 121, at 368.
131. Societal acceptance of a practice may stem from any number of reasons, such as the
importance of industry to the local economy, see Matsui Yayori, Economic Development and Asian
Women, in VoicEs, supra note 124, at 56, or the fact that women who are victimized by such
practices are foreign women whose welfare is of no concern to the population of that particular
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Subjecting the issue of trafficking in women to a more contextual-
ized examination thus demonstrates that the capacity of international
law to combat trafficking and forced labor/slavery-like practices turns
on its ability to respond to the complexities of the full range of
circumstances that characterize the experiences faced by women vic-
timized by these practices. Addressing problems as entrenched in the
socio-economic structure as these demands that we think "outside the
box" in search of innovative solutions and the means to foster the
conditions for their implementation.
